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Abstract—With the increased popularity of smartphones, var-
ious security threats and privacy leakages targeting them are
discovered and investigated. In this work, we present SilentSense,
a framework to authenticate users silently and transparently by
exploiting dynamics mined from the user touch behavior bio-
metrics and the micro-movement of the device caused by user’s
screen-touch actions. We build a “touch-based biometrics” model
of the owner by extracting some principle features, and then
verify whether the current user is the owner or guest/attacker.
When using the smartphone, the unique operating dynamics of
the user is detected and learnt by collecting the sensor data
and touch events silently. When users are mobile, the micro-
movement of mobile devices caused by touch is suppressed by
that due to the large scale user-movement which will render
the touch-based biometrics ineffective. To address this, we inte-
grate a movement-based biometrics for each user with previous
touch-based biometrics. We conduct extensive evaluations of our
approaches on the Android smartphone, we show that the user
identification accuracy is over 99%.
Index Terms—Identification, Touch, Behavioral Biometrics,
Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development in mobile device industry has now
stimulated the blooming of the personalized applications
(checking email, enjoying personal photos) and services (mo-
bile payment, smart home [23]) for more convenience and
better user experience. As mobile devices get involved in more
and more parts of people’ daily lives, the device owner faces
increasing risk of privacy leakage not only from the system or
apps, but also from sharing device with guest users, such as
family members, friends, partners, or coworkers. According to
survey [13], a large number of users concern about their data
privacy and integrity when sharing mobile phones to others.
User identification works as an important component of mobile
devices for personalized services and data access control.
However, explicit identification mechanisms, e.g. PIN code or
password, are annoying, and not application/content specific.
Besides, before handing the device to the guest user, a owner-
triggered protection strategy is labor-intensive and makes most
owner awkward because it shows distrust to the guest [13].
Under this circumstance, it would be good for device to
identify the current user swiftly, silently, and inconspicuously,
as well as provide necessary privacy protection and access
control automatically.
At present, PIN codes or password is the most common
identification and access control strategy in commercial mobile
device operating systems, such as iOS, which is obviously
labor-intensive and time-consuming. Facial recognition [1]
by the front camera is another optional strategy to identify
users. But it is still annoying to require users to take pic-
tures frequently. Besides, the face recognition accuracy is
unreliable with changing environment and frequent imaging is
power-consuming. The latest solution exploits the capacitive
touch communication as a mechanism to distinguish different
users [23], which utilizes touch screen device as receivers for
an identification code transmitted by a hardware identification
token. This mechanism requires special devices. All these
mechanisms have the risk of being imitated, e.g., peeking at the
PIN code, using a photo to cheat the camera, or eavesdropping
on the communication between the transceivers.
On the other hand, the motion sensors integrated in most
modern smartphones have stimulated the research on user
behavior detection. For example, TapPrints [17] indicates the
behavior of tapping on different locations on the touch screen
will be reflected from sensory data, and such observation
may be considered as potential risk of compromising user’s
privacy [5]. In addition, individual users may have their own
interacting behavior patterns, and these motion sensors may
help to characterize user’s behavior to identify users [27].
In this work, investigating the feasibility of utilizing the
behavioral biometrics extracted from smartphone sensors for
user identification, we propose SilentSense, a non-intrusive
user identification mechanism to silently substantiate whether
the current user is the device owner or a guest or even an
attacker. The interacting behavior could be observed while
the smartphone is in relatively static condition. Exploiting the
combination of several interacting features from both touching
behavior (pressure, area, duration, position) and reaction of de-
vices (acceleration and rotation), SilentSense achieves highly
accurate identification with low delay. A great challenge comes
from the circumstance when the user is in motion, such as
walking. The perturbation generated by the interacting will
be suppressed by larger-scale user movement. While most
of existing works neglect this circumstance, SilentSense is
capable of identifying user in motion by extracting the motion
behavior biometrics. As long as the current user is identified,
necessary access control is triggered automatically.
Keeping the sensors always on provides minimum guest
identification delay, but could cause unwanted energy con-
sumption since most of time the current user is the owner
or the current app is not sensitive, e.g., the game app. But an
intrusion may be missed when the sensors are off. Facing this
2debacle, we propose a novel model to estimate the current user
leveraging the observation of owner’s sociable habit. An online
decision mechanism is designed for the timing to turn on or
turn off sensors, which provides a balance between energy
cost, delay and accuracy. Our online decision mechanism re-
sults in an adaptive observing frequency according to owner’s
social habit.
We evaluate the effectiveness of SilentSense through exten-
sive experiments using the empirical data collected from 100
volunteer users in both static and motion scenarios. The evalu-
ation results indicate that in the former scenario, our approach
is able to classify the legitimate user and guest/impostors
with averaged equal error rate about 20% with only one
stroke, 0 error with about 13 strokes. However, when users are
moving, the approach designed for static scenario deteriorate
to with false reject ratio (FRR) about only 18% after 4 steps.
Our integrated approach using motion behavior biometrics
improves the FAR and FRR to reaches 0 with only 3 steps.
Our study also shows that individual behavior patterns are
difficult to be imitated precisely, and the feature is unique.
The evaluation also shows our online decision mechanism can
successfully identify the guest user with averaged 2.26 actions
delay with a 98% accuracy guarantee when 57% time the
sensors are off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we provide the overview of our approaches. We discuss
in detail how to detect various user behaviors in Section III
and present the performance evaluation of our approaches in
Section IV. We review the related work in Section V, and
conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
SilentSense is designed as a pure software-based frame-
work, running in the background of smartphone, which non-
intrusively explores the behavior of users interacting with the
device without any additional assistant hardware.
A. Main Idea
The main idea of SilentSense for user identification comes
from two aspects: (1) how you use the device; and (2) how
the device reacts to the user action.
While using mobile devices, most people may follow certain
individual habits unconsciously. Running as a background
service, SilentSense exploits the user’s app usage and inter-
acting behavior with each app, and uses the motion sensors
to measure the device’s reaction. Correlating the user action
and its corresponding device reaction, SilentSense establishes
a unique biometric model to identify the role of current user.
We investigate the phone usage behavior of our colleagues.
Tiny perturbation of the whole device will be captured by
motion sensors when a user touches the screen. The ampli-
tude of such tiny perturbation depends on the user’s holding
gesture, the touching pressure and coordinate. The frame-
work focuses on extracting essence features from the user’s
behavior, including both screen-touch events and the user’s
motion events, to determine the discriminative patterns of
individuals. Such behavior pattern and dynamics are much
difficult to be imitated or attacked as these are often invisible.
Besides, both our investigation and [13] show that people
share phone with friends from time to time and the share
frequency varies with the owners’ social habit. The phone
belonging to a more sociable owner, tends to have a higher
probability to be shared with guest users, which may require
a relatively high identification frequency, and vice versa. The
social characteristic of the owner can help us to optimize the
observation frequency to reduce the overall energy cost with
a identification performance guarantee.
While the owner is using the phone, it is feasible to
establish a behavior model through automatically learning.
When interacting happens, the system evaluates the probability
of being the owner, and updates the evaluation with increasing
observations to determine the identity silently and automat-
ically. If the current user is a guest, the privacy protection
mechanism will be triggered automatically, which prevents the
privacy leakage while maintaining the trustiness of the guest
user. Based on the historical identification results, the social
characteristic of the owner could be learned to help decide the
observation frequency.
B. Challenges
In order to achieve the identification in an accurate, silent
and fast manner, the following technical challenges should be
addressed.
User Behavior Modeling: To characterize individuals’ un-
conscious use habits accurately, the user behavior model
should contain multiple features of both user’s action and
device’s reaction. In addition, the connection between
features may not be neglected for identification, such as
different interaction coordinates on the touch screen may
cause different reaction vibrations of the device.
Identification Strategy: To establish the user behavior
model, for the owner there are abundant behavior infor-
mation. For a guest, the collected behavior information
may be very limited. In addition, in motion scenarios,
some interacting features will be swamped by the motion
from the perspective of sensory data, which greatly in-
creases the difficulty of accurate identification. Thus it is
challenging to distinguish users with limited information
effectively, even if the interacting features are partially
swamped.
Balance Among Accuracy, Delay and Energy: Nonstop
observation with sensors provides identification with
small delay and high accuracy, but may cause unwanted
energy consumption for the mobile device when the
current user is the owner or a guest is using an insensitive
app, e.g., playing a game. But intrusion may happen
when the sensors are off and the risk increases with
the detection delay. A well designed mechanism is
required to decide the observation timing to reduce
energy consumption while guarantee the identification
accuracy and delay.
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Fig. 1. Framework Overview.
The framework model consists of two basic phases: Training
and Identification, as shown in Figure 1. The training phase
is conducted to build a behavior model when the user is
interacting with the device, and the identification phase is
implemented to distinguish the identity of the current user
based on the observations of each individual’s interacting
behaviors. When a guest user is observed, privacy protection
mechanism will be triggered automatically. After the guest
leaves and the owner returns, privacy protection will be reset
for the owner’s convenience.
Initially, we assume that the device has only the owner’s
information, e.g. a newly bought phone. The framework
trains the owner’s behavior model by retrieving two types
of correlated information, the information of each touch-
screen action and the corresponding reaction of the device
when the user is static. In the motion scenario, instead of
the reaction information, motion features will be detected.
With the owner’s behavior model, the current user will be
identified through one-class SVM classification. One-class
SVM provides a judgement whether the observed features
belong to the owner (true of false). However the identification
accuracy by one observation is usually not high enough for
an identity conclusion, continuous consistent judgements will
increase the accumulated confidence for this judgement. When
the accumulated confidence is high enough, a conclusion
is ready and the newly observed features will be added to
the owner or guest dataset according to the conclusion to
update the model. Gradually, by self-learning, the model will
be upgraded to two-class SVM model, which provides more
accurate judgement.
To reduce energy cost of frequent observations, an optimal
stoping mechanism is designed to determine the timing to
stop observation i.e., turn sensors off, with a good accuracy
guarantee. Based on the recent historical conclusions, the
social characteristic of the owner can be learnt. Here the social
characteristic refers in particular to the frequency/propobility
this owner shares his/her device with a guest. With the help of
the social characteristic, a strategy is designed to determines
the timing to restart observation.
D. Interacting Model
For touch actions, there are three principle gestures: tap,
e.g., texting, clicking item, scroll, e.g., browsing mails and
tweets, and fling, e.g., reading e-books. Different gestures usu-
ally have different touch features and lead to different device
reactions. Interacting with certain app often involves a certain
set of gestures. For a touch action Ti, we combine the app with
its touch gesture and the features captured by this framework
as one observation, denoted as Oi = {Ai, Gi, fi1, · · · , fin}.
here Ai is the app being used, Gi represents the gesture (e.g.
tapp), and fi,j (j ≥ 1) are features of the observed action.
Because of individual habits, the features of the same
gesture for the same app vary for different users. Two types of
features are used in this system: the touch features and reaction
features. The touch features include touch coordinate on the
screen, touch pressure and duration, which can be obtained
from system API. To capture the reaction features, we notice
that diverse gestures and positions for holding the device
by individual users infer different amplitudes of vibration
caused by each touch, which has already been proved by
previous works ( [17], [25]). Such tiny reaction of the devices
produces an identifiable patterns which could be observed
via accelerometer and gyroscope. Therefore, for each gesture
(Gi) in one observation, its feature is the combination of
three touch features and two reaction features, presented as:
FGi = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5}.
E. Identification Strategy
Both the training and identification process are established
based on observations from interacting behavior as illustrated
in Figure 1. In this section, we present our self-learning model
and identification strategy.
Initially, without only the owner’s behavior data, a one-class
SVM model is trained to identify a new observation Oi and
provide the judgement Ji whether this action belongs to the
owner or not, i.e., Ji = true or Ji = false. Lacking of
groundtruth, it is difficult to determine the correctness of the
judgement. To achieve high identification accuracy, we adopt
the SVM model’s credibility for each judgment Ji as the con-
fidence of the framework on Ji. Let this confidence be εi(Ji),
which indicates the probability the framework considers that
Ji is correct for the current observation Oi. Using one-class
SVM, the judgement of one observation usually is not accu-
rate enough to make a identity conclusion. Obviously, more
observations leads to higher conclusion accuracy. Specifically,
let {J1, J2, · · · , Jk} be a sequence of consistent judgements,
i.e. J1 = J2 = · · · = Ji, to continuous observations
{O1, O2, · · · , Ok}. Based on the judgement sequence, an
identity conclusion I1,k can be made, i.e. I1,k = Jk. Then
the conclusion confidence will be cumulated as
P1,k = P(J1, J2, · · · , Jk) = 1− (
k∏
i=1
(1− εi(Ji))), (1)
which indicates the probability this framework considers that
the identity conclusion I1,k is correct. Then the identification
delay dk for a conclusion I1,k is defined as the number
of observations taken to achieve this conclusion. With the
number of observation increases, the framework will be more
4confident to provide a correct conclusion, meanwhile the
delay will increase. Note that, an inconsistent judgement will
interrupt the sequence, and the conclusion confidence need to
be cumulated from scratch. Except some multi-player game,
which is not privacy sensitive, in most cases, there won’t be
frequent switches between guest and owner. Since a conclusion
will change the privacy setting, a high confidence is required to
give an identity conclusion. A conclusion confidence threshold
Pθ can be given to make sure this framework only outputs
conclusion with confidence higher than Pθ .
While the system uses the owner’s model to make identi-
fication conclusions, the observation generating a judgement
with high confidence will be added into the owner or guest
training data buffer accordingly. With a small amount of guest
data, our system upgrades the model to two-class SVM model,
which outperforms the one-class model in accuracy. The SVM
model will be continuously updated using the most recently
buffered data. Considering the training data, the number of
owners usually will be far greater than the number of guest
users, the updating frequency of guest behavior should be
higher than that of owner’s.
F. Observation Decision
In practice, user usually requires a high conclusion con-
fidence, which may lead a undesired long conclusion delay.
In addition, the main energy cost of SilentSense is caused
by sensors. Nonstop observation may cause unwanted energy
consumption, as for most of the time the user is the owner.
The balance among accuracy, delay and energy is challenging.
In this section, we investigate the requirements of the device
owner and design a strategy to determine the timing to start
and stop observation,i.e. turn on and turn off sensors.
First, we consider the privacy requirements of the owner.
Not all apps are privacy related, e.g., game apps are frequently
used but nonsensitive. For an sensitive app, if the user is a
guest, the privacy protection mechanism should be enabled
immediately; if the user is the owner, the protection mech-
anism should be disabled for the owner’s convenience. So
if the current app is sensitive, the privacy and functionality
requirements take priority over energy. The current app can
be detected by system API without extra energy cost. Then
we get the first rule of the strategy: When there is a switch
from a nonsensitive app to a sensitive app, observation should
be started immediately (if hasn’t bee). And while the user is
interacting with a sensitive app, the observation should not be
stopped.
When the current app is nonsensitive, observations help
the framework to collect training data and get ready for a
sudden app/user switch. In this case, nonstop observation is
not necessary and energy waste. The issue is when to start/stop
observation. To guarantee a highly accurate conclusion with
small delay, the main idea of our decision strategy is to
keep the framework confident enough about the current user’s
identity using the sensors as less as possible.
When the observation with sensors has been started but a
conclusion hasn’t been made, the confidence of the current
user’s identity is the accumulated confidence according to
Eq. (1). Although larger number of observation leads to higher
confidence, which implies higher accuracy, the energy cost
will increase too. Formally, let the current touch action be
Tk, which can be acquired from system API, requiring no
extra energy. Its corresponding observation is Ok and the
judgement by SVM is Jk. Let Os be the observation from
which the judgements are consistent with Jk, i.e., Ji = Jk
for s < i < k. Then the framework has a candidate
identity conclusion Is,k = Jk, and its confidence is Ps,k =
1 − (
k∏
i=s
(1 − εi(Ji))). The accumulated energy consumption
from Os to Ok is Es,k =
∑k
i=s ei, here ei is the energy
cost of sensors for observation Oi. If the candidate identity
conclusion is output after the action Tk, then the delay of the
conclusion is dk = k − s (action). We notice that there is
a positive correlation between the delay and the energy cost,
and both of them are preferred to be small. Therefore, we
propose Uk = Ps,k/Es,k as the utility at the action Tk, which
indicates a tradeoff among accuracy, energy and delay. Then,
deciding the time to stop observation can be solved as an
Optimal Stopping problem, where after which touch action Tt
to stop observation so that the utility is maximized and the
conclusion confidence is guaranteed above Pθ . We assume
R(Ut|Ps,t > Pθ) as the expected maximum utility could
be achieved by the following observation with a confidence
constraint Pθ , which is:
R(Ut|Ps,t > Pθ) =
max{R(
Ps,t
Es,t
|Ps,t > Pθ), R(
Ps,t+1
Es,t+1
|Ps,t+1 > Pθ)}.
Here, Ps,t+1 is the accumulated confidence by current con-
fidence Ps,t and the expected confidence ε¯ of SVM using
(1). Es,t+1 = Es,t + e¯, here e¯ is the expected energy cost
for each observation. Both ε¯ and e¯ can be obtained by the
historical observations. Once a stop timing Tt is detected, the
observation will be terminated, and a identification conclusion
Is,t with confidence Ps,t > Pθ will be output for the privacy
protection setting.
When the observation is stopped after the action Tt, the
framework need to decide when to restart the observation.
As we mentioned, a switch to sensitive app will trigger the
observation. When the app is nonsensitive, we estimate the
current user for action Tj based on the recent conclusion It.
Intuitively, if j−t is small enough, then with a high probability,
the current user’s identity is still consistent with It; as time
goes by, the confidence of the identification It will decrease.
In this work, we use the recent social state of the owner,
which decides the confidence decrease rate, to estimate the
current user. When the confidence of estimation fall out of a
lower bound Pϕ, the observation will be started. Formally, the
framework learns the transfer model between guest and owner
from the recent historical conclusions. The model includes two
probabilities Qo2g and Qg2o, which represent the transfer prob-
ability from owner to guest and guest to owner respectively.
When the observation is stopped, the identification for touch
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Fig. 2. The reaction of the device when tapped.
Tj is consistent with the most recent conclusion It, with a
confidence Pj = Pj−1 · (1 − Qo2g) + (1 − Pj−1) · Qg2o, if
It is owner; or Pj = Pj−1 · (1−Qg2o) + (1−Pj−1) ·Qo2g,
if It is guest. Once Pj < Pϕ, the observation will be started,
and a new round of optimal stopping is initiated.
Our online decision strategy achieves a tradeoff among
accuracy, energy and delay with a confidence guarantee. Mean-
while an adaptive observation frequency is yielded according
to the owner’s social habit.
III. BEHAVIORAL BIOMETRIC EXTRACTION
Accurate behavioral biometric of the user is the core for
correct identification. Among the multi-dimension features,
the pure touch features (coordinate, pressure and duration) are
relatively easy to obtain via system API. The challenge comes
from how to capture the essence of the device reactions to each
user’s different actions, and the essence of a user’s motion, e.g.
walking, using the noisy sensory values. In this section, we
will briefly introduce the our strategy to accurately extract the
device reaction features and motion features.
A. Device Reaction to Touch Action
We use the onboard sensors to explore the device reaction
to the three types of touch gestures.
We start the analysis from the features caused by tap-
ping. When tapping event happens, the tapping coordinate,
timestamp and duration could be obtained from system API.
Meantime, the device accelerations along three device axes
(X,Y,Z) are captured by the accelerometer. In order to mea-
sure the amplitude of vibration while tapping, we use the
Ftap =
√
LAx
2 + LAy
2 + LAz
2 to represent the summation
of acceleration vector in the space. LAx, LAy , LAz indicate
the linear acceleration in the device system. Another valuable
reaction feature is the vector of angular velocity obtained from
the gyroscope, denoted by AVtap =
√
AVx
2 +AVy
2 +AVz
2
.
This feature represents the position variation of the device in
the space when touched by a user.
Figure 2 illustrates the reaction of the mobile device when
tapping event occurs while the user is sitting still. In both
sub-figures, the red line segments represents the occurrences
of tapping, and the length of each segment corresponds to
the duration of the tap event. Tapping on the screen will
cause jumping on the sensory data. However, the sensory data
contains noises and errors, because the user cannot hold the
device in absolutely still. Therefore,to eliminate such noise, we
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Fig. 3. The distribution of both vibration and rotation on touchscreen under
a given holding gesture.
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Fig. 4. Sensor data when Fling
calculate the mean perturbation of acceleration and rotation as
features for each tapping event.
We conduct a long period experiments to measure the vibra-
tion and rotation of the device with various touch coordinates.
We separate the touch screen into 25 × 15 small grids and
calculate the mean vibration and mean rotation caused by
tapping from each user for each grid-cell. Figure 3 shows
the statistic device reactions from one of the users, who used
to hold the lower part of the device by left hand, i.e. the
supporting point is near the left bottom, and taps the device
by right index finger. The experiments results show some
interesting observations: (1) the amplitude of vibration and
rotation depend on how the user holds the device. the father
the coordinate from the holding point, the larger the vibration
and rotation will be; (2) the changing trend of the vibration
is obvious, leading to the possible holding position (which is
also a behavior biometrics).
We also investigate the device reaction to fling and scrolling
and compare the reactions to the three gestures. The results
show that, reactions to both fling and scrolling are different
from that to tapping, especially the amplitude. Besides, both
fling and scrolling do not drive the device to rotate in a large
extent.
So far, we mainly consider the condition that the user is
motionless or relatively still while the touch action. In practice,
a user may use the device while walking, the amplitude of the
acceleration cause by walking is much larger than that from
touch, which makes it infeasible to to extract the touch reaction
feature in this case. To address this challenge, we design a
series of methods to extract the biometric walking feature for
identify users in motion.
B. Motion Analysis
For the dynamic scenario, we analyze the motion features
when the user uses the phone while walking, and combine
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the walking features with the interacting features (coordinate,
duration and pressure) to construct the behavioral biometrics
for identifying user in motion.
To accurately capture the walking features of different users,
three steps are conducted in our method. Firstly, considering
a user could hold the phone in any attitude, we convert the
raw acceleration vector in phone coordinate system (X,Y,Z
axis)into the earth coordinate system (north, east, gravity) in
real time. Let the vector in the earth coordinate is EA =
{EAx, EAy, EAz}.There are a lot of walking independent
noise in the acceleration, which will greatly confuse the
walking feature detection. We analyze the acceleration while
walking in the frequency domain, Figure 5(a) shows that, the
energy mainly locates around 2Hz, which is the user’s walking
frequency. The energy in other frequency comes from noise.
To extract the pure walking acceleration, secondly, we filter
EA with a band pass filter to generate EA′. Then we get the
vertical acceleration EAv = EA′z in the gravity orientation
and horizontal acceleration EAh =
√
EA′2x + EA
′2
y . Fig-
ure 5(b) shows the filtered vertical acceleration. A simple step
detection algorithm can be performed on the filtered vertical
acceleration in real time. Thirdly, we extract the walking
feature from the processed acceleration data. The vertical
displacement of a walker is directly correlated to his/her stride
length and height, hence it is an important feature. Besides,
the step frequency and horizontal acceleration pattern also
vary with different users. To sum up, we extract four features
of walking from EAv and EAh: (1) Vertical displacement
of each step by double integration of EAv; (2) Current step
frequency, calculated by the duration of each step; (3) Mean
horizontal acceleration for each step; (4) Standard deviation
of EAv for each step.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implemented SilentSense on Android phone as a service
running background. This service obtains the current app and
touch events from system API, and captures sensory data
from accelerometer and gyroscope. We evaluate performance
of SilentSense in different phases in both static and dynamic
scenarios. Android based HTC EVO 3D and Samsung Galaxy
S3 are employed in our experiments. We have 100 volunteers,
10 of them are the smart phone owners, and other 90 vol-
unteers use their phones as guest users. In average, for each
owner, there are about 50 guests. Several types of apps are
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considered sensitive in our experiments: message, mail, album,
contacts and social networking apps. We divide touch actions
into three categories by gestures, including tap, scroll and fling.
In practice, the touch gestures are not limited to the three
principle gestures, and there may be long press, double touch,
pinch open, etc.. But the fraction of such complex gesture is
less than 5% for daily usage. As a result, we neglect other
gestures in this experiments. More than 50 actions of each
gestures from each guest user are collected. For each owner,
thousands of actions of each gestures are collected.
A. Identification in Static Scenario
First, we explore the uniqueness of the behavior biometric in
the static scenario. With more than 100 actions for each user,
we analyse the key features of users extracted from both the
touching behavior and reaction of smartphone. The analysis
shows that there exit big diversity of each interacting feature
among different users’s. The diversity mainly comes from the
habits and biometric features of users, and the combination of
multiple features provide unique user features. For example,
the mean duration of scrolls gesture of 100 users varies from
200 ms to 1200 ms, and the touch pressure varies from level
2 to level 40. Figure 6 shows 13 randomly selected users’
interacting features of three types of gestures and present the
diversity explicitly.
Then we evaluate the performance of identification by three
types of gestures, tap, scroll, and fling. The main difference
between scroll and fling is the moving speed and distance of
the finger. Fling is much faster while the distance of scroll
is longer. In SilentSense , observations and identification are
made based on the three touch gestures. Figure 7 presents the
false acceptance ratio (FAR), and false rejection ratio (FRR)
of identification conclusion by different gestures with different
number of observations. Here the FAR is defined as the ratio
of the number of identifications misjudge a guest as an owner
over the total number of guest actions; and FRR is defined as
the ratio of the number of identifications misjudge the owner
as a guest over the total number of owner actions. The results
of 100 users show that, as illustrated in Figure 7(a), the mean
FAR of identification by one observation of tap is 22%, by one
fling action is 9%, by one scroll action is 23%. The FAR is
reduced to below 1% after observing about 3 fling actions and
with about 13 observations the FAR achieves 0 for all three
gestures. Surprisingly, Figure 7(b) shows that FRR almost
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Fig. 6. Touch event features for different users.
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Fig. 8. Identification based on sequence of random gestures.
achieves 0 with only 2 observations for each gesture. The
experiments result show great discrimination of three gestures
based on multiple features extracted by SilentSense .
Now, we evaluate the performance of SilentSense in a more
general scenario, with 100 users interacting with smartphones
freely as their daily usages, i.e., the action sequences are
random combinations of three types of gestures. Initially,
the smartphone does not have any guests’ behavior data,
the framework could only identify the current user by one-
class SVM model. Our experiments show that the initial
accuracy is only 72.36% with one observation and the FAR
is 24.99%. However, when a two-class SVM model is trained
with increasing amount of guest data, SilentSense reach high
accuracy of identification with a small amount of observations.
Since the amount of training behavior data for the guest user is
much smaller than that of the owner’s data set, our experiments
show that it is much faster to achieve a high accuracy for
identifying the owner than identifying the guest. Even so,
the framework could reach over a 80% accuracy within 10
observations for identifying a guest. Figure 8(a) takes the
results from five random selected guests and plots how soon
the framework could identify the guest. Similarly, as shown in
Figure 8(b), the owner will be identified with in 6 observations.
Overall, in a general scenario, with only one observation, the
FAR and FRR are about 20%. But, with about 12 observations
of various actions, the FAR and FRR are both reduced to
nearly 0, meaning that there is no incorrect identification.
B. Identification in Dynamic Scenario
In this part, users interact with smartphone while walking.
Recall that, the vibration and rotation reaction features caused
by touch are no longer feasible due to the large movement
cased by walking. In this case, if only touch features (coordi-
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Fig. 10. FAR and FRR by different number of steps observed.
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Fig. 11. Identification based on walking feature.
nate, pressure and duration) are used, as shown in Figure 10(a),
although the FAR reduces to 0% after only 2 steps, the FRR
is high as 18% even after 4 steps. In the dynamic scenario,
we extract 4 walking features, including vertical displacement,
step duration, mean and standard deviation of the horizontal
acceleration, from the filtered accelerations. First, we explore
the discriminative of walking features. As shown in Figure 9,
the walking pattern varies greatly for different users, which
give us an opportunity to identify the walking user rapidly.
So, we combined the walking features with touch features to
establish the SVM model for dynamic scenario. To evaluate
the identification performance of SilentSense in dynamic
scenario, 50 volunteers are required to use phones while
they are waking freely. We presents the FAR and FRR of
identification results in Figure 10(b). Our experiments show
that the FAR and FRR reduce to 0 after only about 3 steps.
Considering the different amount of training data, Figure 11
presents the achieved identification accuracy for randomly
selected owners and guests separately. After 12 steps, the
accuracy to identify a guest can achieve 100%, and after 7
steps, the accuracy to identify the owner can achieve 100%.
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Fig. 9. Walking features for different users.
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Fig. 12. Online decision performance.
C. Online Decision
Using the historical observations, the probability Qo2g the
owner shares the phone with a guest can be learned. Based on
the our online decision strategy, the framework dynamically
starts or stops observation, while keep a confidence about the
current user’s identity. In the experiments, three users use
phones with different phone share frequencies. We set the
confidence for a conclusion Pθ = 0.98, and the acceptable
estimation confidence Pϕ = 0.8. Figure 12(a) presents the
confidence changing with observations. During the rising
edges, the observation has been started, while during the
falling edges, the observation has been stopped. The result
shows that our online decision mechanism can successfully
identify the user with averaged 2.26 actions delay with a
98% accuracy guarantee when 57% time the sensors are off
for an owner who has 10% probability to share the phone.
Figure 12(a) also presents adaptive observation frequencies
yielded by our online decision strategy according to the
owner’s sociability. While the observation stopped, motion
sensors are off and no extra energy is cost by SilentSense .
Figure 12(b) illustrate the energy saved by the online decision
strategy for different Qo2g. When the owner rarely shares the
phone, more than 90% energy can be saved; while the owner
share his/her phone frequently, the energy saving decreases
and a relatively high observation frequency is necessary.
V. RELATED WORKS
Most modern smartphones and tablets are equipped with
multiple sensors, which have risks to expose the user’s ac-
tivities and privacy to attackers [5], [8].For example, Ta-
pLogger [25] deduces a user’s tap input to a smartphone
from its integrated inertial sensory data. Other similar works
include TouchLogger [4] and ACCessory [19], which also
utilize accelerometer readings to infer keystrokes. As an
improved work, TapPrints [17] infers the tap information on
a smartphone or tablet from the combination of accelerometer
and gyroscope for better accuracy. And such framework also
demonstrates the possibility of compromising user’s privacy.
Researchers also inferred keystroke on traditional keyboard
based on acoustic signal [2], [28], timing event observa-
tion [10],and electromagnetic waves [24]. (sp)iPhone [16]
takes the advantage of motion sensors to detect the vibration
and infer the keystroke of nearby keyboard. Both [3] and [26]
study the possibility of identifying the password sequence
by examining the smudge left on the touch screen. Besides,
[15] and [20] propose the method to infer a user’s input
by observing the touch action with a camera. These works
indicate that the interaction between user and device can be
observed through sensors and may cause a privacy leakage.
There are two categories of biometrics for identification
users: physiological (such as fingerprints, facial features) and
behavioral biometrics (such as speaking, typing, walking).
Physiological biometrics usually requires special recognition
devices. Some physiological biometrics, like face and voice
can be detected by smartphones, but usually cost expensive
computation and energy cost and have a high error rate.
For example, in [14], the (equal error rates) EER for face
recognition is around 28% and for voice is around 5%.
Keystroke is a popular behavioral biometric. [12] presented
a survey on the large body of literature on authentication
with keystroke dynamics. Researchers also propose authen-
tication token based mechanisms to identify legal users,e.g.,
wireless token [18]. However, they require additional hardware
and are not convenient for daily smartphone usage. On the
smart phones with touch screens, PINs, pass-phrases, and
secret drawn gestures are the commonly used authentication
methods [7].Such approaches are easily deployed with off-the-
shelf smartphones, but they are vulnerable to shoulder surfing,
smudge and other attacks. Recently, there is a growing body
of work that use the features of touch behavior to verify users.
Touch Behavioral Biometrics: Several existing approaches
have used the touch behavior biometrics for various security
purposes. [6] proposes an password application, by which the
user draw a stroke on the touch screen as a input password.
Pressure, coordinates, size, speed and time of the stoke are
used to identify valid user. Overall accuracy of this work is
77% with a 19% FRR and 21% FAR. [27] uses four features
(acceleration, pressure, size, and time) to distinguish the true
owner and impostor to enhance the security of passcode. Its
9identification system achieves 3.65% EER. A user enters a
password by tapping several times on a touch surface with
one or more fingers. PassChord failed to authenticate for
16.3% of the time. There are some other work addressing
the user identification issue with touch features, e.g., [21].As
we see, with pure touch data, there may be a high error
rate. Furthermore, the above work verify users in an explicit
way, which works similar as inputting a pincode and are
inconvenient for device share or multi-user scenarios.
Recently, there are some work address the user identification
with behavior biometrics in continuous or implicit manner.
In those work, identification services run in background and
identify the current user in real time. For example, [11] con-
tinuously authenticates users based on 30 behavioral features,
including touch features and motion sensor features. In this
work, the EER is approximately 13% with a single stroke
and converges to a range between 2% and 3% with 11 to
12 strokes. SenGuard [22] combines motion, voice, location
history and multi-touch data to identify users of smartphone,
whose average error rate is 3.6%. FAST [9] uses a special
digital sensor glove to achieve highly accurate continuous
identification. Those work use special devices or motion
sensors to enrich the identification features to improve the
poor accuracy with pure touch information. But they ignore
the scenario that the user uses mobile phone while walking,
where the micro features caused by touch is suppressed by
the large scale movement which will make the accuracy of
the exiting methods deteriorate.
Here we propose SilentSense to identify users with a
background service running continuously and implicitly in
the off-the-shelf smartphone. SilentSense achieves an high
accuracy in both static and dynamic scenarios, which are not
addressed in previous work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present SilentSense , a framework to verify
whether the current user is legitimate owner of the smartphone
based on the behavioral biometrics, including touch behaviors
and walking patterns. We establish a model and a novel
method to silently verify the user with high confidence: the
false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR)
could be as low as < 1% after only collecting about 10
actions. We have found that a user’s touch signatures if used in
conjunction with the walking patterns will achieve significant
low error rates for user identification in a completely non-
intrusive and privacy preserving fashion.
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